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Civilizational analysis, political discourse, and reception of Western
modernity in post-Soviet Russia1
Yulia Prozorova
Introduction
Russian history of the 20th century reveals abrupt and radical changes to the
fundamental visions and trajectories of Russian society. The “post-Soviet” era unfolded
a distinct perspective on modernity that attempted to combine the Western liberal
democracy model with the legacy of Soviet Communism, along with some perpetuating
traditional structures.
The Western influence on Russia after 1991 was remarkable. The “reencounter” with
Western modernity, the “historical choice” to implement its cultural and political forms
in Russia, and intense interactions between Russia and the West after the collapse of
the USSR have been crucial driving forces for modernization and transformation
processes in contemporary Russia. Russia as the inventor of an alternative modernity
project that had been in a long conflict with the West made a critical step toward
Western modernity seen as the only possible civilizational pathway. The early 1990s
were transformational in Russia’s history when its society demonstrated an ultimate
“openness” to the Western models. Russia initially borrowed Western cultural ideas and
institutional forms, but they became more limited, regulated, or filtered out later.
This era was marked by new societal opportunities and heated debates about alternative
social and political trajectories for post-Soviet society. Discussions of the new
constitution and legal foundations for the Russian society indicated a conflict between
neoliberal and neoconservative political programs, and between the parliamentary and
the presidential republican projects of political architecture, in which intellectuals, law
specialists and political agents took part.
The assumption that Western liberal democracy had become the universal model was
proclaimed in the late 1980s2. However, after almost three decades have passed, this
belief has proven unrealistic. Modern societies, including post-Communist ones that
acknowledged the adherence to the “Western idea,” demonstrate persistent differences
in their cultural and institutional characteristics. Western-inspired projects gave rise to
patterns and orientations that differ greatly from the original ideal. Diverse reactions,
reflections, and evaluations of the Western-type liberal democracy, which emerge in
different discourses, contribute to the articulation of Russia’s post-Soviet version of the
modernity project.
1

This study was funded by the Russian government, project “Foundations and trends of the Russian
civilizational dynamics in culture, politics, economy”, No. AAAA-A17-117030110143-6.
2
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest Summer (1989): 3–18.
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Official political discourse retains a special importance since the communicative
practices of the political elites generate interpretations and meanings, which are able
to become programmatic for the design and arrangement of the main societal
domains. This paper considers civilizational analysis and associated multiple
modernities theory as a promising framework for understanding of the post-Soviet
Russians experience of modernity in Russia. It also provides a review of how
contemporary Russian political discourse receives and interprets the Western
modernity project.
Theoretical background: civilizational analysis and multiple modernities theory
After the Communist project failed, it was declared that Russia had “returned to
civilization”3 and had integrated into the European “civilized community.” This was
accomplished by having made the “historical choice” to adopt political liberalism,
democracy, and the free market, which constitute the core of Western modernity. The
following radical transformations have been interpreted by political elites and some
academics as the next stage of modernization for the previous Soviet endeavor.
The “Post-Communist transition” and “modernization” experience are seen to be the
principal trends and the most influential frameworks in the post-Soviet period.
Teleological assumptions and the idea of the universality of the Western project of
democratic market-based society regarded as the epitome of modernity and a “blueprint
for the future,” constitute the core of “transitology”4. Transition is regarded as a cultural
and political convergence of post-communist societies with the West. This frame of
reference calls for a singular developmental pathway towards modernity that postSoviet Russia can follow only by implementing the Western ideas and institutional
forms.
In that political discourse, the concept of modernization appeared to be a symbol of the
long-term reform initiatives undertaken by the Russian government representing
Russia’s adherence to the “community of civilized states.” In the discourse of the social
sciences, modernization theory has become an umbrella approach that has covered a
number of models explaining the peculiarities of the post-Soviet transformation.

3

Iver Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: Identity and International Relations (Routledge,
1996).
4
Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13:1 (2002): 5-27;
Johann Paul Arnason, “Designs and Destinies: Making Sense of Post-Communism,” Thesis Eleven, 63
(2000): 89-97.
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However, the proposed models of Russian modernization (e.g. the “convergence,”
“catch-up modernization,” and “recurrent modernization”), as well as the transitology
framework disregard the socio-cultural and historical legacies that have shaped the
diversity of the modernization experience and its outcomes5. The diversity and variety
of modernity are undertheorized in those frameworks.
Critics of such a modernization approach proposed alternatives that claimed to be more
sensitive to Russia’s cultural and institutionally different frameworks (institutional
divergence, sociocultural modernization, world-system theory and the local
civilizations theory)6. However, these frameworks provide deterministic and
reductionist explanations and are unable to grasp the social transformations with their
diverse and internally controversial cultural characteristics. They also neglect historical
contingency, cultural autonomy and the creative potential of social imaginaries and
cultural interpretations.
The renaissance of the civilizational perspective7 in sociology was inspired by a critical
reaction to the prevalence of the teleological and universalistic Eurocentric conception
of modernization. Convergence and transition models revealed their epistemological
weakness given the indisputable diversity and heterogeneity of contemporary
societies. Civilizations are viewed as long-term historical complexes constituted by a
combination
of
cultural
orientations
and
institutional
patterns.
Although civilizational analysis comprises different theoretical approaches, the
common focus is on the cultural dimension – the variability of cultural visions and
interpretations of the world, and on their potential in shaping institutional formations.
These complexes entail a cultural and institutional diversity of “transitional”
modernizations along with well-developed modern societies that call into question the
idea of “the end of history” when all ideological and societal differences disappear.

5

Ibid; Paul Blokker, "Post-Communist Modernization, Transition Studies, and Diversity in Europe,"
European Journal of Social Theory 8, no. 4 (2005): 503-25.
6
Ruslan G. Braslavskiy, “Sotsiologicheskie modeli sovremennogo rossiyskogo obschestva: ot globalnoy
modernizatzii k globalnoy modernosti”, in Peterburgskaya sotziologiya segodnya: Sbornik nauchnih
trudov Sotziologicheskogo istituta RAN (St.Petersburg: Nestor-Istoriya, 2010), 7-20.
7
Benjamin Nelson, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Johann Arnason, and Toby Huff articulated the most important
ideas and frameworks for understanding of civilizational phenomena, although the research field
remains heterogeneous.
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The assumption of “historical contingency” set against the cultural domain seen as an
autonomous symbolic reality, open to various competitive interpretations and
imaginaries in such a way that emergent meanings and orientations have the capacity
to transcend the existing social frameworks. The ideas of contingency, discontinuity,
and creativity of action and social imagination, along with openness and indeterminacy
of societal development oppose the evolutionistic and structuralist approaches as well
as the historicity, determinism and teleologism of the widely accepted modernization
theory8. The cultural and the imaginary constitute an irrevocable dimension of the
institutions9. It is this potentially creative aspect of the institutions that facilitates the
radical transformations in the history of societies.
One of the principle themes of civilizational analysis is the dynamic of
“intercivilizational encounters.” B. Nelson, who coined the term, focused on the
relations between different “structures of consciousness” comprising cultural worldviews, ideas, logics and key images (of experiences, self, etc.) that direct human
thinking, perception, agency and experience10. The concept of intercivilizational
encounters can be understood more broadly as a relationship between different
civilizational complexes or “paradigmatic cultural patterns” and their respective
elements11. The expansion and the adoption of the Western modernity project by the
recipient societies with different historical and civilizational backgrounds, produce a
crucial modern form of intercivilizational encounters.
Such encounters “often result in decisive cultural borrowings, adaptations of alien ideas
and creative syntheses emerging from challenges to inherited ways of thinking […] in
new cultural creations which decisively modify the future civilizational landscape for
one or more of the parties involved”12.
Civilizational analysis assumes the multiplicity of civilizational complexes and
traditions that account for the diversity of responses to Western innovations. Multiple
modernities theory, introduced by Shmuel Eisenstadt, is a crucial contribution to the
theoretical debate on the dynamics of contemporary societies, especially the postCommunist ones.
8

See Johann P. Arnason, “Civilizational Analysis, Social Theory and Comparative History,” in
Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory, ed. by Gerard Delanty (London; New York:
Routledge, 2006), 230-241; Wolfgang Knöbl, "Contingency and modernity in the thought of J.P.
Arnason," European Journal of Social Theory 14, no. 1 (2011): 9-22.
9
Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. K Blamey (MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA1987 [1975]).
10
Benjamin Nelson, On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations, ed. Toby Huff
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981).
11
Ibid, p.83-84.
12
Donald A. Nielsen, “Rationalization, Transformations of Consciousness and Intercivilizational
Encounters. Reflections on Benjamin Nelson’s Sociology of Civilizations,” in Rethinking Сivilizational
Analysis, ed. Said Amir Arjomand and Edward A. Tiryakian (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 120.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/7
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It proclaims that “modernity and Westernization are not identical” and that “Western
patterns of modernity are not the only "authentic" modernities”13. The modernity
project (liberalism, democracy, capitalism, nation-state) that had originated in the West
constitutes a crucial (albeit ambivalent) “basic reference point” for other societies
across the globe; however, its diffusion entailed “the interaction of new orientations
with older legacies” that gave rise to the diverse interpretations of its basic components.
Intercivilizational encounters presume a selective acquisition and possible mutation of
originally borrowed patterns incorporated into a civilizational context with its local
cultural traditions and institutional premises.
[…] in societies belonging to the other major Eurasian civilizational complexes,
the modernizing transformations induced or at least accelerated by Western
influences were at the same time conditioned by socio-cultural backgrounds that
left enduring marks on the resultant patterns of modernity14.
As Arnason suggests, the encounter between the West and the rest should not be
regarded as “the Westernization of the world,” or a triumph of civilization in the
singular, but they should be understood as “the global projection of a problematic that
remains open to diverse interpretations in the West and alternative ones in the nonWestern arena”15.
The multiplicity of forms of modernity arises from the ambiguity of interpretations and
responses to the constituent problematiques of modernity (self-determination, human
autonomy and emancipation, rationality, reflexivity, progress, etc.)16 are open to rival
interpretations, since modernity itself is poly-interpretative. The variety of competing
versions of political, social and economic orders may derive from the different reactions
to Western modernity, and its internal tensions between different conceptions of
civilizational identity and imaginaries (e.g. Slavophile, Westernizers, Eurasian), etc.17
13

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129(1) (2000): 1-29; Shmuel N.
Eisenstadt, “Some Observations on Multiple Modernities,”in Reflections on multiple modernities :
European, Chinese, and other interpretations, ed. by Dominic Sachsenmaier, Shmuel Eisenstadt, and
Jens Riedel (Brill, 2001), 27-41.
14
Johann P. Arnason, “Civilizational Analysis as a Paradigm in the Making,” in Encyclopedia of Life
Support Systems (Paris: Eolss Publishers, France, 2007). http://www.eolss.net/SampleChapters/C04/E6-97-01-00.pdf
15
Johann P. Arnason, “Understanding Intercivilizational Encounters,” Thesis Eleven, 86(1) (2006): 51.
16
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Modernity and the Construction of Collective Identities,” International
Journal of Comparative Sociology 39(1) (1998): 138-158; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “The Paradox of
Democratic Regimes: Fragility and Transformability,” Sociological Theory 16(3) (1998): 211-238;
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129(1) (2000): 1-29.
17
For the historical examples, which demonstrate the plurality of responses to the Western project, see:
Sudipta Kaviraj, "Modernity and Politics in India," Daedalus 129, no. 1 (2000): 137-62; Blokker, PostCommunist Modernization; Paul Blokker, “Confrontations with Modernity: Openness and Closure in
the Other Europe,” Eurozine Online, 2010 http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2010-06-15-blokkerPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017
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The intercivilizational encounter framework allows for studying the post-Soviet version
of modernity as a reinterpretation of the original Western institutional models and
cultural ideas. In his study of diverse experiences of modernity in several postcommunist Eastern European countries, Blokker18 acknowledges the importance of the
communist legacy, which in various ways shapes transformations in these societies.
However, he disregards the significance of the pre-Communist traditional structures,
histories of long-term intercultural contacts, and the imperial background that have left
their marks on the post-Communist experience. In the case of post-Soviet Russia, both
the pre-revolutionary legacy and the Soviet Communist experience must be taken into
account. Some of the features of the Russian civilizational complex define the context
in which the post-Soviet reception of the Western modernity takes place. There are
some crucial differences between Russian and Western civilizational complexes,
among them religious, legal, and how power is used.
Donald Nielsen identified a set of differences between Russia and Western Europe
which shaped the specificity of Russian civilizational structures. They include: the
Byzantine path of inheritance and reception of classical and early Christian traditions;
the interconnection and quasi-separation of church and state; religious sects and
movements that “failed to sustain ‘liberal’ political ideas, rationalized and universalistic
orientations”; and the patriarchal and communal orientations that differ from the notion
of “associations” that predominate in the Western social structures and institutions19.
Medieval Russia was mostly unfamiliar with the antique classical legacy (the works of
Plato, Aristotle, late Greek philosophy, Hellenic science, Roman law), and aware only
to a limited extent of early Christian theology, all of which had an immense effect on
the cultural orientation of Western Europe and carried marked civilizational
consequences20.

en.html; Jeremy, CA Smith, “The Many Americas. Civilization and Modernity in the Atlantic World,”
European Journal of Social Theory 13(1) (2010): 117–133; Peter Wagner, “From interpretation to
civilization – and back: Analyzing the trajectories of non-European modernities,” European Journal of
Social Theory, 14(1) (2011): 89–106; Mota, Aurea, Delanty Gerard. “Eisenstadt, Brazil and the
Multiple Modernities Framework: Revisions and Reconsiderations,” Journal of Classical Sociology, 15
(1) (2015): 39-57.
18
Blokker, Post-Communist Modernization.
19
Donald A. Nielsen, “Sects, Churches and Economic Transformations in Russia and Western Europe,”
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 2(4) (1989): 493-522.
20
Nelson, On the Roads; Toby E. Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West.
2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Toby E. Huff, “Europe as a Civilization: The Revolution
of the Middle Ages & The Rise of the Universities,” Comparative Civilizations Review 69 (2013): 6586.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/7
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The profound formative influence of Byzantium on the Russian civilizational complex
is widely accepted. The diffusion of Byzantine civilization (its law, religion, political
and ideological forms, literature, and art) was welcomed by the Russians of the Middle
Ages, however, their adoption was remarkably selective. Various elements of the
Byzantine complex were accepted, rejected and transformed21. Although Russian legal
proceedings and codes of the 10th -17th centuries contain some norms of the Roman Law
adopted through the translation of the Byzantium legal texts22, Russian secular law
showed few signs of direct Byzantine influence23.
The systematic reception and incorporation of Roman law into the Russian legal code
and practices happened only in 18 th -19th centuries. The legal modernization and
codification of the late imperial period in Russia tended to admit the European ideas of
human rights and freedom, but at the same time the vision of the traditional monarchical
and autocratic power structure remained mostly intact. “Legal dualism,” that is, the
controversial coexistence of the rational law imposed by the state versus the traditional
common law based on popular practices of justice and paternalism, is a characteristic
feature of the Russian legal tradition24. The legal system has little autonomy while the
principle of “informal justice [that] is above any formal law,” is still conventionally
accepted25.
The impact of Byzantium and the Mongols on the evolution of distinct cultural and
political patterns appear to be the most significant. According to Obolensky, Byzantine
civilization was more efficiently assimilated in the Eastern European countries
characterized by an evolving or already established centralized form of government.
Another important observation is that the relationship between the development of
monarchical institutions and the acceptance of Byzantine culture was often reciprocal
– “not only did political centralization pave the way for Byzantinization; the reverse
was equally true”26.

21

Dimitri Obolensky, “The Relations Between Byzantium and Russia (11th–15th Century),”in XIIIth
International Congress of Historical Sciences (Moscow, 1970), 1–13.
22
E.V. Salogubova, “Elementy rimskogo prava v rossiyskom sudoproizvodstve X-XVII vekah,” IVS
ANTIQVVM. Drevnee parvo, 1 (4) (1999): 173-179.
23
Obolensky, The Relations Between Byzantium and Russia.
24
Andrei N. Medushevsky, Rossiyskaya pravovaya tradicia – opora ili pregrada? (Moskva: Fond
“Liberalnaya missia”, 2014).
25
Tatiana B. Koval, “Elita i nravstvennost (religiovedcheskie zapiski),” Mir Rossii 3-4 (1995): 131157.
26
Obolensky, “The Relations Between Byzantium and Russia,” p.11.
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The Muscovite state formation and its power structure is undeniably the major domain
where Byzantium and Mongol influences coalesce and where the Oriental tradition of
political culture culminated. It is only possible to name briefly some of those
peculiarities that shape the contour of the Russia state-society pattern: fusion of secular
and sacral power; patrimonialism; centralization and concentration of power and
resources of control; a tight connection between state formation and territorial control
and expansion; and cultural distance between the rulers and the masses; and
establishment of a “state-conditioned society”, an institutional framework which
presupposes the systematic subordination of society to the imperatives of state
formation, etc. (Arnason 1993).
Peter the Great fundamentally reformed the state in accordance with the Western model
of the “well-ordered-society.” His epoch is marked by an articulated imperial project
and a practice of transformation-from-above with deliberate assimilation of Western
forms. The radical Westernization and modernization of Peter the Great contributed to
the rationalization process, and to secularization, as well as scientific and technological
development. Nevertheless, there exists a persistent internal contradiction underlying
the incentives to impose the rule of law, with its associated codification, modernization
and liberalization of the legal sphere. The centralized autocratic state system requires
submission of the person to the state that maintains almost unlimited power. State
domination continues to be the legitimate embodiment of all power. In this context, the
emergence of a public sphere, legally autonomous entities and the development of
human rights, along with individual and collective autonomy, have always been
complicated by the traditionally strong patrimonial state that intruded, absorbed and
controlled the society.
European modernity with its “the disembodiment of power” (in Claude Lefort’s
terminology) has never happened in Russia. The ruler has always been a physical and
symbolic incarnation of the state, society, and law. Historically, Russia has evolved as
a patrimonial-bureaucratic state with a sacralized authority and power, organized
around a single ruler/leader. One of the most important adoptions came from the late
Byzantine era conception of Caesaro-papism, that is, a subordination of Church to the
secular ruler as a cornerstone of Russian absolutism.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/7
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The Orthodox Christian worldview, which is characterized by a general otherworldly
orientation found their reflection in the relevant “structures of consciousness,” and in
visions of secular social orders. These frameworks were applied to government, to
images of power, to the roles of authority and elites, and to the definition of economic
ethics and rationality27. In comparison to Protestantism in Western Europe, Russia’s
ascetically oriented sects of the 17th century did not become a driving force in the
formation of “modern” structures, and exerted a very limited influence on the main
aspects of life. The traditional structures continued to dominate, including the mysticcontemplative nature of Orthodox Christianity28.
Russian particularism, the notion of “sobornost” (conciliarity), as well as the distinct
social, cultural and political orientations of a more communal and patrimonial type,
contributed less to social differentiation and rationalization in Russia, and in fact
opposed “universalism” and social, cultural and political institutions of a more
"associational" character “rooted in a series of historical transformations towards a
more rationalized, differentiated, universalistic and individuated system” of the West29.
In Russia, a service state system evolved that corresponds to the “liturgical state”30
described by Max Weber. This is a state whose needs are met by a contrived system of
duties and the individual’s position in the social structure. The Russian state is also
characterized by a unification of authority and property, sacralization of power, and the
role of authority in distribution of wealth and in the implementation of radical
reformation “from above.” According to Medushevsky, this system reached its apogee
during the Stalinist era31.
The Soviet experience in the creation of communist society and its modernization
program demonstrates the continuity of certain traditional pre-revolutionary Russian
models. The pre-revolutionary complex of the patrimonial rulership, caesaro-papist
state and church continued in the Soviet period in “the new Communist ideological
form of articulation of “religion,” state, and society.”32
27

See Koval, Elita i nravstvennost; Tatiana B. Koval, “Trudovaya etika v pravoslavii,” Obschestvennie
nauki i sovremennost 6 (1994): 55-70; Tatiana B. Koval, “Lichnost i sobstvennost. Christianstvo i
drugie religii mira,” Mir Rossii 2 (2003): 3-45; Andreas Buss, “The Economic Ethics of RussianOrthodox Christianity: Part I,” International Sociology 4 (3) (1989): 235-258, and Part II: “Russian Old
Believers and Sects,” International Sociology 4(4) (1989): 447-472.
28
Buss, “The Economic Ethics,” Part I and Part II; Nielen, “Sects, Churches and Economic
Transformations.”
29
Ibid, pp.499-501.
30
Andrei N. Medushevsky, Proekty agrarnych reform v Rossii, XVIII - nachalo XXI veka (Moskva:
Nauka, 2005); Andrei Medushevsky, Russian Constitutionalism: Historical and Contemporary
Development (Routledge, 2006), p. 68.
31
Andrei N. Medushevsky, Rossiyskaya pravovaya tradicia – opora ili pregrada? (Moskva: Fond
“Liberalnaya missia”, 2014), p. 34.
32
Nielsen, “Sects, Churches and Economic Transformations,” p.516.
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The core of the Soviet model was a fusion of an imperial and revolutionary traditions33.
The Soviet program of modernity was characterized by integration of ideological,
political, and economic power represented by the party-state; “interconnected principles
of organization”: party-state, command economy, and ideological orthodoxy; the
conception of “socialism in one country”; the fantasy of a shortcut to affluence through
total social mobilization; an ideology analogous to a secular religion. At the same time,
the Soviet model attempted to embrace rationality, the ideas of progress, and mastery
of nature34. It adopted a superficial universality and introduced a selective and
repressive “socialist law.” This complex legacy, together with diverse cultural
interpretations, evoke a reshaping of the assimilated Western models and suggest the
character of the resultant modernity patterns in post-Soviet Russia.
Post-Soviet “re-encounter” with the West: political discourse on the Western
project of liberal democracy
As mentioned before, the multiplicity of modernities resulted from the diversity of
civilizational backgrounds; it is inspired by the societal reflexivity represented by
various visions of societal development and evaluations of Western innovations that
grow in different discourses and comprise the interpretative-discursive dimension of
“intercivilizational encounters.” Discourses may reflect indigenous structures of
consciousness, with ideas and images of the historical experience and collective identity
that resonate with preconditions of the political and economic models of the Western
project.
Although diverse responses emerged in different discourses outside of the political
realm and agents of modernization come from various fields, the ideas and visions that
were articulated by the political officials have had a profound impact on the policymaking process and the shape of post-Soviet Russia’s institutional landscape; indeed,
more so than non-political elites. Compared to the various political and public actors
who have limited access to the main communication arenas, state officials have
acquired more communication resources to express and propagate their ideas, to control
and dominate the discourse. In present-day Russia, the political arena tends to be more
isolated, homogeneous and state-regulated. Critical reflections on Western democracy
and liberalism are expressed through different genres of political communication.
These include presidential addresses, interviews, political articles, official statements
and documents, and the like.

33

Johann P. Arnason, The Future that Failed: Origins and Destinies of the Soviet Model (Routledge,
1993).
34
Johann P. Arnason, “The Soviet Model as a Mode of Globalization,” Thesis Eleven 41 (1995): 36–
53; Johann P. Arnason, “Communism and modernity,” Daedalus 1 (2000): 61–90.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/7
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An important aspect of the debates on the direction of post-Soviet modernization and
the question of the relevance of the Western project, is the broad civilizational discourse
and the competing frameworks of the Russian civilizational identity, for which the
Western conception is a crucial reference point. Such discourse was revitalized during
perestroika, when a critical revision of the Soviet project of modernity and
reconsideration of Western capitalism took place.
In the 1980s, the idea of a “common European home” and the concept of Russia’s
civilizational identity as part of Western civilization, were articulated along with the
novel political paradigm of “new thinking.”35 By the late 1980s, the possibility of
implementing the Western capitalist model in Russia was introduced. On the eve of the
USSR’s collapse and throughout the early post-Soviet years, the idea of the universality
of the institutional forms and cultural orientations of Western modernity dominated. As
it was proclaimed, and having acknowledged the necessity of modernization according
to Western standards, Russia had “returned to civilization.” Even after the dissolution
of the USSR, this concept and the scenario of Russia’s integration into the European
“civilized community” retained its relevance.
Boris Yeltsin’s Addresses to the Federal Assembly of 1994-1999 reflect Russia’s
aspiration to assimilate the Western-European civilizational variant and the necessity
of introducing the “civilized” institutions and practices such as a market economy, rule
of law, civil society, and private property. However, by the mid-1990s, this vision of
Western modernity was supplemented with Russian particularism. In his Address of
1996, he noted that Russia is following the common developmental path of civilization,
but in its own distinct way. Yeltsin argued that Russia is a unique country with its own
interests and its own logic of development36.
Yeltsin’s presidency ended with the Address called, “Russia at the Turn of the Epoch”37.
He concluded that the choice of the pathway toward a market economy made in 1991
“was and still is right” and “we do not have another path.” Vladimir Putin’s article,
“Russia at the Turn of the Millennium” continues this narrative: Russia “has entered the
highway by which the whole of humanity is travelling”38. It has no alternative and
characterizes the Soviet period as a wrong “dead-end route.”

35

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira (Moskva:
Politizdat, 1988).
36
Poslanie prezidenta Federalnomu sobraniyu 1996.
http://www.intelros.ru/2007/02/05/poslanie_prezidenta_rosii_borisa_elcina_federalnomu_sobraniju_rf_
rossija_za_kotoruju_my_v_otvete_1996_god.html
37
Poslanie prezidenta Federalnomu sobraniyu 1999.
http://www.intelros.ru/2007/02/05/poslanie_prezidenta_rosii_borisa_elcina_federalnomu_sobraniju_rf_
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That political discourse highlighted Russia’s strong cultural connection with Europe.
Putin noted that Russia is a part of Western European culture, and Russians are
Europeans. This position supports Russian borrowing of the “universal economic
mechanisms and democracy” from the West.
Since the mid-2000’s, “modernization” has become one of the key topics of the
government’s economic and political programs integrated into the universalist
civilizational discourse. This modernization is based on democratic values that
themselves will allow the country to proceed to the next stage of civilization39.
Since the mid-1990s, radical Westernism has competed against exceptionalism and
nationalist trends in the discourse identifying Russia as a distinct civilization. Although
Yeltsin claimed Russia to be “an integral part of the civilized world,” he also stressed
that Russia “cleaves to the traditional values”40. The idea of a Russian civilizational
uniqueness continued to grow in the late 2000’s, along with the conception of a multipolar global political architecture.
“The multiple forms of the contemporary world reflect its more fundamental
characteristic–cultural and civilizational diversity.”41 It was argued that global
competition acquired a civilizational dimension. Russia’s mission lies in its
“contribution to the cultural and civilizational diversity of the contemporary world and
to the development of an intercivilizational partnership and dialogue”42. The ultimate
point of this argument is that Russia is a unique “state-civilization”43.
This conception of Russia’s distinct civilizational status among other existing historical
civilizational complexes justifies its “special path” to modernity. This civilizational
framework incorporates ideas that subsequently entailed original interpretations of
democracy and the market economy.
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Putin began his presidency with the claim that Russia needed to search for its own way
of renewal, not to copy the experience of others or transfer “abstract models and
schemes to the Russian soil.” It should also combine “the universal principles of market
economy and democracy with Russia’s reality.”44
There is not and could not be a political choice for Russia other than democracy.
At the same time, I would like to say and even stress: we share the universal
democratic principles that are accepted across the world. However, the Russian
democracy is the rule of the Russian people in particular, with its own traditions of
self-government, and not at all an implementation of the standards that were
imposed upon us from the outside45.
“Adaptation” marked the beginning of a decisive turn towards a revisionism and
critique of the Western liberal democracy. The revisionist trend in political discourse
summed up several fundamental “values” rooted in Russian traditions: the concept of
the “Russian idea” (Rossiyskaya ideya)46. It proclaimed that Russian democracy should
rest upon traditional orientations.
“Traditional consolidating values” highlighted in the late 1990s have turned out to be
key for the political discourse and institutional development of the following years47.
It took the form of accenting
 Patriotism,
 “Greatness of authority” (derzhavnost),
 Social solidarity with an “inclination to collective forms of life that dominate
over individualism,” along with
 “Statism” (gosudarstvennichestvo), a deep-rooted paternalistic disposition.
The idea of a “strong state” is crucial for the post-Soviet political discourse. The
traditionally important role of the state and state institutions was proclaimed as Russia’s
major difference from the developed Western countries, such as Great Britain and the
US.48
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The state, its institutions and structures have always played an exceptionally
important role in the life of the country and its people . A strong state is not an
anomaly for a Russian man, not something to be fought, but, on the opposite, a
source and a guarantee of order, an origin and the major driving force for any
changes. Society desires a reinstatement of the regulatory and leading power of the
State to the extent, which would be required, considering the traditions and the
current condition of our country49.
The “strong state” is seen as a prerequisite for Russia’s democracy since “many Russian
democratic institutions are created from above.” “Civil society requires a strong state
as an instrument of development and maintenance of order, for defense and
strengthening of democratic institutes.”50
Despite public activism, wide social support and contribution to democratic changes in
late-1980s and early 1990s, the introduction of democratic institutions and practices or
reformation of the state on democratic grounds after the collapse of the Soviet Union
was to a greater degree a state-supervised policy. The articulated vision of the state and
its central role in the democratic reformation of post-Soviet Russia suggests the
continuity of the transformation initiated from above, much as it was in prerevolutionary imperial Russia and the Soviet “revolution from above” and Gorbachev’s
reformist project.
These ideas articulated and elaborated in political discourse laid the foundation for
alternative interpretations of the original Western models. Disagreements with Western
democracy, reconsideration of the relevance of the Western-type democracy to Russian
society, and a critique of the West for its hegemony and monopolization of the
democratic model (dissemination and intrusion of a specific form of democracy),
became more pronounced after the mid-2000s.
The conception of a “sovereign democracy”51 was introduced that suggested an
independent character for Russian democracy and that negated the relevance of other
democratic models. The new ideological framework became the climax of the political
discourse on the unique and national character of Russian democracy. The concept of
“sovereign democracy” was invented to propagate the Russian version of a “political
language” or “philosophy” that competes with other “languages” and “discourses”
(predominantly the Western ones) and communicates Russian-born ideas and
interpretations.
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This conception emanates from the notion that the foundation of the “sovereign
democracy” lies in the “cultural matrix” defining political practices: “striving toward
political wholeness through the centralization of power functions,” “idealization of the
goals of political struggle,” and “personification of political institutions”52. In the
present context, Russia’s modern political arrangement focuses on patrimonialism
embedded in a strong centralized state with personified authority. Power and authority,
embodied by President Putin, is again recognized as the source, the producer, and the
guarantee of the modern reforms.
The personification of political institutions is obvious. People say that in our
country personality displaces institutions. It seems to me that in our political culture
the individual personality is an institution—by no means the sole institution but a
very important one. The holistic outlook is emotional. It demands the literal
embodiment of images. Doctrines and programs do, of course, matter. But they
find expression, above all, through the image of a charismatic personality, and only
then with the aid of words and syllogisms53.
A special place in the discourse is devoted to the formula “if there is Putin – there is
Russia, if there is no Putin – there is no Russia.”54 In this statement, the President is
recognized as a condition for the Russia’s very existence in the current historical epoch,
and also as an embodiment of power and the nation. This contradicts the principle of
the “disembodiment” of power, law, and knowledge as a fundamental orientation of
Western democracy55.
The fundamental principles of the Putin state — the primacy of the state, the
consolidation, centralization and monopolization of power through the personification
of authority in the figure of the President as the embodiment of Russia, and as a
condition for the existence of the state — imply a fusion of the spheres of politics, law,
economy and culture. All this stands in opposition to the autonomy and independent
functions found in democratic societies.
Personified centralized authority concentrates resources and monopolizes the functions
governing these realms. It also awards itself the right to know and understand the needs
and paths of development of each sector, oftentimes ignoring public opinion, while coopting institutions of civil discussion and participation.
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Apart from this, the centralized structure of political life is in contention with the
pluralist dispositions of Western modernity, its ideals of openness and accessibility of
the political arena, distributed decentralized power and blurring of borders between the
center and the periphery56.
Political officials still pay lip service to the Western democratic ideals of a civil and
open society, the primacy of law, respect and support for human rights, although they
support the concept of "the special path” and the “Russian world.” Conservative and
traditionalist values emphasized in Putin’s last presidential term, along with antiWestern rhetoric and the critique of Western liberalism, stress the distinction between
“we” and “the Western Other.” Conservatism, traditionalism, and the increased
intolerance of “multiple forms of life” reveal a tension between traditional and modern
orientations. Interactions with the West assume a more revisionist shape.
Nationalistic and patriotic discourses in Russia respond to the lack of social solidarity
and a search for a national idea that integrates and unites numerous regions with diverse
cultural, religious, and historical backgrounds and different ways of interacting with the
central authority. Apology for the Soviet period and its imperi al imaginary and
continuing nostalgia for that very period remain key themes, along with patriotism and
Russian historical and cultural greatness.
According to Blokker57, “the dual return of nationalism and religion” in some European
post-Communist societies where it had gained wide social support is a “form of critique
and response to the predominant narratives of liberalism and Europeanism, bemoaning
the lack of local autonomy, the fragmentation of societies, and the undermining of
traditions and social cohesion.” Two types of responses compensate for the state of
uncertainty and lack of identity accompanying the post−Communist transformations:
reliance on the universality of Europeanness and liberal democracy, or invocation of
local traditions and identities. In reality “this dual understanding of modernity is
strongly intertwined” as “a duality of openness and closure”58. The case of Russian
post-Communist experience of modernity clearly approves of this ambivalent and
contradictory orientation.
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Conclusion
The modernization that took place in Russia in the post-Soviet period cannot be
considered in the normative perspective of a replication of the Western model of liberal
democracy. The experience of other post-Soviet and post-Communist countries
demonstrates a variety of responses to the Western modernity project. The post-Soviet
transformations should be regarded as a version of modernity originating and unfolding
in response to the post-Communist “re-encounter” with the Western democratic project.
It entailed complex interactions between traditional and modernizing forces, new
understanding and creative interpretation of modernity inspired and derived from
certain aspects of enduring civilizational forms, traditional structures, and historical
legacies.
The Western project of modernity was a factor in Russia’s turn toward liberal
democracy and market economy, along with its themes of individualization, autonomy,
emancipation, and pluralism. In 1994, Yeltsin defined Russia as a “democratic, federal,
constitutional, social and secular state.”59 Political discourse of the early 1990s was
characterized by a positive perception of Western ideas and models as constituents of a
reliable universal project of a modernization that might be able to open and emancipate
Russia from a totalitarian past. This initiative was supported by a civilizational
discourse stressing a “return to civilization”. However, since the end of 1990s, the
Western program has been criticized. It was challenged by the concept of Russia’s
“special path,” the “Russian idea” (Rossiyskaya idea), “Russian world” (Russkiy mir),
Russian “state-civilization”, and a messianic framework.
The political discourse on Western modernity strongly corresponds with the discourse
on Russia’s civilizational identity (European, “unique civilization,” Eurasian, “statecivilization.”) It revives traditional orientations and representations (“collective forms
of life”, statism, paternalistic attitudes, the “strong state,” transformation from above,
and imperial imagery.) They provide contextual interpretations of some basic
components of the Western project (e.g., the conception of “sovereign democracy”) that
support and legitimize a reshaping of the Western models. At the same time, the
exceptionalist political conceptions are dissonant with the universalistic orientation of
Western modernity.
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The imperial legacy and the experience of Soviet modernity have intervened to confront
the Western program with the local Russian traditions of political culture and political
participation. The repercussion of imperial imaginary is noticeable in the culturalpolitical frameworks of Eurasianism and Russkiy mir (Russian world), apology and
nostalgic images of the USSR as a superpower, and in the political messianism designed
to oppose the Western hegemony.
Official discourse presents the West in terms of messianism, universalism, absolutism
and imperialism and defines Russian/ Eurasian/ Orthodox civilization in opposition to
these aggressive tendencies60. The opposition of the “Russian world” to the West and
the idea of an external threat to Russian sovereignty, traditional values and uniqueness,
are apparent in the new ideological project and discourse that emerged in recent years.
However, on the historical “fork in the road,” signified by “Russia has chosen
democracy”61 and self-isolationism is “the way we will never follow”62. Democratic
values are understood to be universal, although the universality of the Western
framework for the construction of a democratic society and its relevance for
contemporary Russia are now contested.
Retraditionalization and restoration of the symbolic and ideological repertoire from the
recent non-democratic past are on the march with the introduction of a series of legal,
political, and social reforms that strengthened state capacity, promoted centralization,
and consolidation of power and constrained the public sphere and autonomy. The
modern Russian political system model has evolved into a super-presidential republic,
which is characterized by the lack of any considerable separation of powers, as the
president is vested with near-absolute executive and legislative powers. Such a system
resembles the preceding historical forms of absolutism and constitutional monarchy and
restores historical continuity of the legal tradition 63. This regime can be defined as
“authoritarian democracy”. The definition expresses “an opinion made up of a unique
combination of democracy and authoritarianism, whose contradictory relations are
dialectically reproduced at a new convolution, each time creating a similar synthesis”,
and “there can emerge and exist various forms of restricted democracy and
authoritarianism.”64
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The idea of a strong state is characteristic of some modern democratic regimes, although
“high-capacity states” always run the risk of de-democratization65. The civilizational
dimension of this problem is fundamental, although “fragility and instability are
inherent in the very constitution of modern constitutional-democratic regimes”66.
The revival of the meanings and ideas of the traditional political culture is a twofold
issue. It is instrumental in the sense that it provides cultural infrastructure that is able
to legitimize the restauration of the patrimonial-authoritarian configuration behind a
democratic façade. However, in Russia, it is also a reflection and an effect of a broader
cultural context of meanings and imaginaries integrated into the long-term civilizational
pattern of culture and power.
Although one may conclude that Russia cannot escape her non-democratic historical
path, the post-Communist era is notable for a renewed and expanded horizon of
meanings enriched by the democratic imaginary. Along with creative interpretations of
traditions, this intensifies the tension and competition between different perspectives
and social imaginaries that may inform and produce new societal forms and projects.
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